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Abstract 
This paper is about creativity. It proceeds from an understanding of 
the promise of the concept of cognitive innovation as a focus for 
collaboration between the sciences, arts and humanities. The value of 
the concept in this context lies in its approach to creativity as a 
bootstrapping cognitive process in which the energies that shape the 
poem are necessarily indistinguishable from those that shape the 
poet. Keywords: Creativity, Cognitive Innovation, Theoretical 
Neuroscience, Art, Science, Technology. 
 
Introduction 
For the purposes of this paper the exploration of the idea of 
cognitive innovation embraces an understanding of creativity that is 
not exclusively concerned with conscious human thought and action 
but is also intrinsic to our cognitive development. As a consequence, 
we see the possibility for the idea of cognitive innovation to provide 
a theoretical and practical platform from which to explore 
disciplinary differences in our understanding of creativity. In this 
paper we make suggestions of how two particular concerns; those of 
theoretical neuroscience and those of the history of art, science and 
technology might find the concept of cognitive innovation useful. 
The presentation of this paper has a challenging format in that it 
comprises a common introduction, two separate papers published in 
a parallel text and a brief common conclusion. The demands that this 
makes upon the reader we acknowledge as a cost involved in 
preserving the intellectual distinctiveness and conventional voices of 
the disciplinary territories inhabited by the authors. To synthesise 
and homogenise them into a single style we felt would result in a 
“voice from nowhere’ and undermine the speculative and formative 
aspects of our thinking. Although the demands may be unusual they 
are in fact are no more unusual than many of the cross cultural 
exchanges that are the commonplace of most academic conferences, 
or the normal format of newspapers, commercial television and 
indeed the experience of most of the mediated information we 
negotiate in our daily lives. In this we situate an academic discussion 
of creativity and cognition in the normal (and unselfconscious) 
operation of our creative capacity to make meaning from experience. 
From a transdisciplinary perspective our underlying expectation, in 
an academic context, is that reading the text will ultimately be 
productive and return critical insight to the primary disciplinary 
concerns of the reader. In sum, we offer a narrative in which the 
aggregates of interaction between quite distinct disciplinary methods 
and voices are made available to the reader as a collage. In this way 
hope that the text will open up a space which stimulates new insights 
from unexpected connections between the parallel perspectives. 
This essay began life in a series of exchanges over the past five 
years as a group of us gained experience of each other’s intellectual 
strategies and practices through research collaboration. As a group 
comprising theoretical neuroscientists, arts practitioners, cultural 
anthropologists and critical theorists from the humanities we felt that 
the interdependence of creativity and cognition was well recognised 
as significant in our various disciplines but began to suspect that 
there were some important discrepancies in our (often unstated) 
assumptions. Like many cross-disciplinary interactions, it took time 
for the participants to understand the variable nuances of terms they 
had hitherto thought to have universal meaning – not least because 
they were also terms in common use. Terms like, ‘value’, ‘novelty’ 
and ‘creativity’, it turned out, not only meant very different things in 
the arts, humanities and sciences but also had widely variable current 
uses in everyday contexts. In addition, reference points that seemed 
to be shared in the literature that did attempt to cross disciplinary 
boundaries often turned out to have very different meanings. This 
was compounded by the way that concepts such as art, and science 
are mobile and contingent in their general application and in the arts 
and humanities in particular are a constant topic of revisionist 
thinking. As an initial response it was tempting to seek common 
ground in simple metric, and much work that follows this approach, 
as for example in the coalition between neuroscience and the arts, 
literature and cinema, has this emphasis.   
At first flush the scientific measurement of creativity is seductive, 
but on closer inspection reveals itself to be something of an 
oxymoron. In the arts and humanities the measurement of creativity 
is a vexing problem that sits uncomfortably in auction rooms, private 
galleries, museum collections and art schools. In this context, in 
which creativity has resisted definitive valuation, the term has been 
politically hi-jacked so that it has become a marker of value added 
(‘creative coffee’, ‘creative industries’) rather than a marker of a 
quality of interaction with the world as an exceptional subjective 
combination of cognitive skills and competences. In the sciences, 
whose truth claims are, in the very best sense, tautologies that allow 
informed prediction, the frequent disconnect between 
phenomenological metrics of creative potential and actual creative 
achievement causes similar discomfort. 
These rather obvious observations did not seem quite so clear to 
us until, through considerable effort and a little luck, we had the 
opportunity to work with a large group of researchers from a dozen 
or so disciplines (and as many countries) all thinking hard about 
creativity. It became obvious that if the question we shared was ‘how 
creativity might be measured’ then we would need to agree what it 
was that we were measuring. Paradoxically, it also became clear that 
this would not be answered through tighter and tighter definition, but 
by recognition of the contingency of the concept. At the heart of the 
conundrum that we needed to resolve was the tension between the 
quantitative measurement of a property (creativity) manifest in the 
world and the inner, mostly occult, properties of the creator. 
Creativity as a concept or quality was (and is) considered in the arts 
primarily as an externally observable (behavioural) property that can 
only be understood partially, provisionally and from the standpoint 
of the present. In the sciences, mostly concerned with internal 
(structural) properties that give rise to creative behaviour, much of 
the focus has been on metrics that enable informed prediction of 
individual creative potential. It was in the attempt to reconcile this 
conundrum that we turned our attention to the topics of novelty and 
cognitive innovation, and our method to transdisciplinarity. As this 
paper attempts to make clear, our claim is that cognitive innovation 
and creativity are intimately related; the former being to do with the 
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processes of building the knowledge and behavioural repertoire of 
the individual, and the latter requiring the explicit generation of 
something that measurably extends the knowledge and/or behaviours 
of others. In this way we hope to offer some resolution to the 
conundrum that stifled progress on the integration of our thinking as 
well as opening the way to the inclusion of problematic concepts 
such as phenomenology and consciousness into the scientific 
exploration of cognition. 
The outline above is intended to stress that the paper that follows 
began life almost in “media res” and its contribution is primarily 
methodological in the sense that both authors (and many of those 
researchers to whom they owe an intellectual debt) have approached 
this problem as an epistemological challenge that resonates with the 
intellectual uncertainties that lie at the core of much contemporary 
academic research. As a transdisciplinary tactic we elected to 
produce a paper in which the contributing specialisms retain their 
academic and methodological distinction and voice but position their 
arguments in such a way as to open up new topics and concerns that 
can be returned to in their originating disciplines. For this reason, 
rather than meld our differences, for reasons well developed in post-
colonial studies we have retained the contrasting styles of both 
authors and arranged the contributions side-by-side in two columns. 
This may be a little unusual, and even frustrating, but we wanted to 
be sure that each contribution could be self-standing and read 
independently of the other. At the same time we hoped that in their 
juxtaposition in the spirit of the collage or flea market (so beloved of 
the Surrealists) in which the context of presentation offers a minimal 
coherence they suggest to the reader where they might need to look if 
the vexing issue of understanding and measuring creativity is to be 
taken further. Our intention is that we might avoid many 
misunderstandings by acknowledging that what we are trying to 
tackle is, and also is not, necessarily the same thing. In what follows 
the two authors have maintained their disciplinary perspectives. 
In her paper, Denham starts from a consideration of Chalmers' 
(1995) analysis of easy and hard problems in consciousness and 
argues for adopting a similar functional approach to theorising about 
creativity. She shows that cognitive innovation, the recursive process 
of exploration, exploitation and synthesis, can be expressed in the 
form of a recursive function that usefully abstracts the process of 
developing the self. It also clarifies the multifaceted role of novelty 
as a boundary marker of the known and bearer of new information. 
Creativity in this context is argued to be an evolutionary exaptation 
of cognitive innovation, amplified by cultural and societal 
resonances. Creativity can also be expressed in a recursive functional 
form by including terms reflecting the broader societal context within 
which individuals live and work. Ultimately, this analysis leads to a 
new, more precise, more nuanced definition of creativity (and non-
creativity) that it is hoped will have wider resonance across many 
fields. 
Punt proceeds from Metz’ suggestion that the cinema is a 
technological experience in which the viewer engages with their  
perception in action and from that draws a line through an historical 
account of art and technology to argue that the aesthetic and material 
forms of both are externalisations of some of the tendencies and 
properties of human cognition that neuroscience has identified, while 
others are the consequence of cultural determinants and choices that 
themselves function in collaboration with the various processes of 
human cognition. This he argues can be seen at work in the way that 
science, art and technology have changed in the past. From this he 
proposes that the concept of cognitive innovation may help us 
recover a particularity to the idea of artistic creativity that 
distinguishes it from the broader use of the term to identify an 
economic niche.  
 
Conclusion 
The bold claim that we make is that cognitive innovation is a 
fundamental strategy that has evolved in living organisms, driven by 
the need to flexibly adapt to the changing pressures on existence. 
Creativity is a generative exaptation of this life-force which feeds on 
the rewards triggered by the internal recognition of novelty and the 
cultural and social linkages between individuals. Expressing both 
cognitive innovation and creativity in the form of recursive equations 
has helped us to start unpacking the implications of these claims. 
Cognitive innovation involves a recursive process of exploration, 
exploitation and synthesis which confers (some degree of) autonomy 
on the individual. Creativity is distinguished from cognitive 
innovation by requiring the explicit generation of something that 
measurably extends the knowledge and/or behaviours of the 
individual and ultimately others. As such the concept of cognitive 
innovation invites us as cognitive neuroscientists to review the 
considerable literature on consciousness in our consideration of new 
metrics for creativity, and secondly suggests to the humanities, 
another resource to add to its armoury when considering the social, 
political and economic determinants of technological change. We 
hope this new way to think about creativity may provide a useful 
broad consensus across a range of disciplines, which recognises the 
recursive and multi-faceted nature of creativity, and the fundamental 
importance of understanding the explicit and implicit subjective and 
societal perspectives. We also hope that it paves the way for further 
steps in the understanding of creativity by addressing novelty as a 
complex multifaceted feature of cognitive and socio-cultural systems. 
  
Post Script  
One thing has become abundantly clear to us as we ponder creativity 
in the twenty first century: this is not a problem that can be resolved 
without generosity and collegiate collaboration. This means that 
although there are two distinct voices in this paper the intellectual 
ownership of the thoughts that they articulate are shared between the 
authors as well as the network of colleagues who have enriched the 
discussion with support and criticism. We hope in this way that the 
paper articulates the problems with greater clarity and, as a social 
manifestation, is simultaneously suggestive of creativity in action. 
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The Creativity Function 
Susan Denham 
Creativity, the ability to think or act creatively, is a highly valued 
quality that nevertheless remains rather ill defined. The currently 
popular operational definition which forms the basis for 
countless studies in the cognitive (neuro-) sciences (the 
generation of something both novel and useful), says little about 
creative practice or the sense of creativity felt by the creator. In 
this sense, creativity is rather like consciousness; we all know 
what we mean but both terms are difficult to define. Here I argue 
that creativity may be better understood as an exaptation1 of 
generic processes of exploration, selection and synthesis. 
Inspired by Jack Mackay Fletcher's argument2 that Chalmers' 
approach to breaking down theoretical considerations of 
consciousness into qualitatively different classes of problems 
could profitably be applied to creativity, I similarly draw on 
mathematical functional forms to clarify the discussion. This 
approach suggests a new way of thinking about creativity, which 
provides pointers towards more holistic objective measures of 
creative potential. 
Easy and Hard Problems  
The idea that the easy problems of consciousness are ones that 
can be expressed in a functional form was originally proposed by 
Chalmers (1995). For example, y = F(x) could represent the 
identity, y, of the face in image, x, as determined by the function, 
F. From a cognitive science perspective we can think of F as a 
process which acts on a set of objects, x, including, for example, 
facts, memories and perceptions. Although not necessarily 
solved, Chalmers regarded explaining conscious phenomena of 
this type as a relatively easy problem in comparison with the 
hard problem which he argued is to explain the sense of 
conscious experience. Explaining conscious experience is clearly a 
qualitatively different problem from explaining face recognition 
(although both involve awareness). What we are asking is how it 
feels to experience the world as some other system. This requires 
something more even than recording the unobservable internal 
processes of another because what we are asking is what it feels 
like to be in the place of that system. In this sense, thinking 
about creativity is similar to thinking about consciousness. 
Creativity also offers easy problems accessible to objective 
measurement (e.g. generating innovative solutions in a given 
task), and it also poses more fundamental problems involving the 
subjective experiential perspective; what does the process of 
creativity feel like, why is being creative apparently so 
compelling?  
Returning to consciousness, if we simply epitomise the 
experiential problem of consciousness as one of qualia (‘what is 
 Creativity in Action: Pulling Things Together 
Michael Punt 
 
In the cinema … I know that I am really perceiving, that 
my sense organs are physically affected, … and I also 
know that it is I who am perceiving all this, that is the 
perceived – imaginary material is deposited in me as if 
on a screen, that it is in me that it forms up into an 
organised sequence, that therefore I am the place where 
this really perceived imaginary accedes to the symbolic 
by its inauguration as the signifier of a certain type of 
institutional social activity called ‘cinema’.   
In other words, the spectator identifies with himself, 
with himself as a pure act of perception (as wakefulness, 
alertness): as the condition of possibility of the 
perceived and hence as a kind of transcendent subject, 
which comes before every there is.   
Metz, C. 1997. The Imaginary Signifier Psychoanalysis and 
the Cinema. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. p.49 
 
A Short History of Creativity 
In the trajectory of human biological, social and cognitive 
history, creativity has marked out a watershed that has allowed 
us to register a profound potential in antiquity that can offer 
guidance and quality to the present. In this respect the present 
concept of creativity has its firmest foundation in the various 
manifestations across the world of what we like to call the 
Renaissance.  
However we may now feel about the adequacy of the 
historical category of the Renaissance, our current 
understanding and valorisation of the human quality of 
creativity is defined by the interventions of individuals who 
considered the world around them and thought that through 
material and critical practices they could better reflect the 
material and spiritual needs of the individual. Those moved to 
action in this context had to do two things that hitherto had 
been thought of quite separately: (i) they had to dig deep 
within themselves to explore what it was that, at the 
experiential and phenomenological level, drew perception and 
representation into a coherent gesture, and at the same time (ii) 
they had to find ways of representing those aspects of human 
experience that were valuable in ways that had meaning for 
other humans. The migration of these imperatives from 
established institutions to the individual precipitated new 
opportunities for understanding and shaping the world. So 
much so that creatively marking divergence from orthodoxy 
(as for example in the depiction of space) became a formalist 
trope for human insight. In this way creativity became 
inextricably entwined with the individual and this detached the 
absolute authority of quality from the history and norms of 
                                                     
1 Exaptation, a term introduced by Gould and Vrba (1982), denotes a shift in the function of a trait from that for which it originally evolved. For 
example, bird feathers originally evolved for heat regulation but were later co-opted for flight. 
2 The ideas expressed here were inspired by the 'Off the Lip' keynote presentation of Sundar Sarukkai in which he pointed out the significance of 
the bracket in mathematics, and the talk given by Jack Mackay Fletcher in which he discussed the Pretty Hard Problem of Creativity and the use of 
the functional form to distinguish easy from hard problems. Jack argued that within Chalmers’ framework creativity is a 'pretty hard' problem. It is 
pretty hard because it cannot be expressed in simple functional terms. Off the Lip: Transdisciplinary Approaches to Cognitive Innovation. Plymouth, 
7-11 September, 2015. 
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it like to see red’), then the question is ill-posed; there can be no 
one answer to this question even from the subjective 
perspective. What it’s like to see red depends on what else is 
around at the time, e.g. see (Purves, Lotto, Williams, Nundy, & 
Yang, 2001). And, even if the stimulus and context are the same, 
in the face of unchanging stimulation, the viewer can, and 
generally will, perceive a number of different interpretations of 
the scene, as documented in the extensive studies of perceptual 
multistability; for a review see (Leopold & Logothetis, 1999). In 
sum, the scientific literature relevant to discussions of qualia 
reveals that there is no one-to-one mapping between the 
physical world and perceptual experience. This lack of obligatory 
correspondence between physical and mental worlds means that 
conscious experience is essentially idiosyncratic (Noë, 2010); so 
even if we know what it is like to see red for system A, there is no 
guarantee that it tells us what it’s like for system B. Something 
similar is clearly likely to apply in the case of creativity; what 
counts as creative for one individual or one situation may be very 
different for another individual, or the same individual in a 
different time or place.  
If we only consider the qualia of conscious experience then our 
thoughts turn towards a rather passive conceptualisation of a 
conscious being as a viewer of the world. Clearly this is not 
sufficient; it overlooks the fundamental need to understand the 
'viewer' more holistically as an autonomous active being and the 
essential life force of agency3 (Noë, 2010); the creation, 
development, maintenance and intentionality of the self through 
engagement with the world. It is precisely in issues of 
contingency and agency that consciousness and creativity 
become intricately linked. 
Cognitive Innovation 
To establish a basis for discussing creativity I would like first to 
consider a more generic process, namely cognitive innovation4. 
Cognitive innovation is conceptualised as a recursive process in 
which an individual probes its boundaries to seek out new 
knowledge, selects promising avenues for more extensive 
exploitation, and synthesizes what it learns within its growing 
body of knowledge, which includes knowledge of how to act in 
the world and how to interact with other individuals. Agency is 
inherent in this definition of cognitive innovation, and 
innovations emerge in some way from the possibilities afforded 
by changing relationships between the individual and its 
environment (including other individuals), and changing 
knowledge structures within the individual itself.  
Does cognitive innovation offer an easier problem, a possible 
route into understanding creativity? Might cognitive innovation 
be expressed in a functional form? The answer is not 
immediately obvious, but there are possibilities suggested by the 
notion of recursion (Pickering, 2010). If F represents the mental 
processing of an individual, and x the set of things it knows 
about, then we can capture cognitive innovation in a functional 
form if we allow F to operate on itself; i.e. F is a recursive process 
(or set of processes) that is changed in the course of acquiring 
antiquity that had prevailed. The triumph of observational 
representation over pictorial convention became a marker of 
the autonomy of the individual that the Renaissance promised 
more generally. The radicalism and personal liberation that 
this engendered has resonated for six centuries. As a 
consequence the various attempts at institutional repression 
appear to only have stoked the fires of individual expression to 
the extent that novelty and creativity (in the arts) have become 
synonymous with a modernist avant-garde. The benchmark of 
creativity in the arts then is the manifestation of a novel 
perception that diverges from the norm. The fact that this is 
also manifest in economic activity has not gone unnoticed by 
scholars.  
For some, the cultural determinism of creativity is perhaps a 
step too far, and the insight and driver of this paper (and our 
collaboration) is to ask if the spurs of creativity might not also 
derive from those aspects of biology, and cognition 
fundamental to all living organisms that are (for whatever 
reason) amplified in the human. We have been led to ask 
whether creativity in the social and economic realm might be 
also understood as a legible manifestation of a cognitive habit 
that fuels an intrinsic exploratory drive. This leads us to ask to 
what extent the history of secessionist movements, the likes of 
which have shaped the story of art, science and culture for the 
last 600 years, can be understood as an opportune narrative of 
progress that is in fact driven by the apparently inexorable lure 
of novelty. This points to the compelling fascination of 
thinking about creativity and cognition as a systemic and 
representational dyad in that it touches (and challenges) both 
our knowledge and assumptions about our cognitive 
capacities, and the cultural valorisation of creativity as a 
criterion of representational competence. 
Cognitive Innovation 
The coalition of creativity and cognition as a theoretical 
platform on which to build theories of aesthetics, 
interpretation or form has been a significant concern in critical 
theory. In the past four decades it has provided both valuable 
insight and methodological paradigms for interdisciplinary 
research as it has enriched our understanding of creative 
practice. Reflection on this foundation has opened the way for 
the development of the more totalising concept of cognitive 
innovation that Denham develops in her parallel paper. Her 
discussion of the recursive process in the context (and 
language) of theoretical neuroscience is suggestive of Metz’ 
thoughts on the cinema experience. The claim underpinning 
cognitive innovation is that in humans and animals there is an 
irresistible attraction to the novel, and this is mirrored by 
internal cognitive processes that privilege new events. Such a 
tantalizing double reflection of apparatus and context can, 
however, only be perceived through externalization (at both 
world and system levels) which, wherever one stands in the 
debate about representation, is simultaneously the outcome of, 
and trigger for, novelty perception. The cultural 
                                                     
3 Agency here is used rather loosely to mean an entity that is able to perceive, think, learn and make choices about its actions (a human being for 
the purposes of most of the discussion). 
4 Cognitive innovation is the focus of the CogNovo programme (cognovo.eu) 
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new knowledge and skills.  
Ft+dt, xt+dt  ←  Ft(Ft, xt, st) 
where Ft represents all internal (mental) processes, xt is the set of 
ideas, facts, words, and so on that are known by the individual 
and can be exchanged with others, st are things in the world 
perceptually accessible to the individual and t is an index of time. 
Cognitive innovation refers to changes in F and x as the 
individual builds its knowledge, x, and processing capabilities and 
skills, represented by F. 
Implicit and Explicit Knowledge 
This formulation may throw some light on why it is we have 
conscious access to some knowledge (generally termed 
declarative or explicit knowledge) while we do not have access to 
other types of knowledge (non-declarative, procedural or implicit 
knowledge) (Squire & Dede, 2015). Although x is by definition 
known, F can never be explicitly known as it is a process (or 
complex set of processes). We can never have direct access to F, 
only to the results of its operations, x. However, although we can 
define the set x as the set of what is known, this does not mean 
that the entirety of x can occupy consciousness at the same time. 
The point of consciousness is perhaps rather that it can 
(temporarily) confer a privileged position to selected subsets of x 
which can be manipulated in the process of thinking, or 
exchanged with others in communicative acts. 
In the brain, both facts and procedures are thought to be stored 
in the form of changes in network connectivity. As a 
consequence both forms of knowledge alter the processing of 
the system in some way. The rather glib distinction I have just 
made between explicit and implicit knowledge therefore needs 
to be further considered. In the case of explicit knowledge the 
information can be held as an item in working memory within 
the conscious present. Implicit knowledge is somehow different. 
For example, when we read we gain access to words and ideas, 
but we cannot say much about how we read (the process of 
reading). Perhaps the difference is also one of time. Implicit 
knowledge cannot be brought into working memory as a unit as 
it has (sometimes considerable) temporal extent. Consider, for 
example, the concert pianist who ‘knows’ a Beethoven sonata; 
what the pianist actually knows is the processes necessary to 
generate the actions that produce the sequence of notes that 
make up the sonata. While fragments or static structural views 
(e.g. in the metaphor of a spatial map) can be accessed 
consciously, the entirety of the work as it exists in time is only 
accessible in time. Consciousness has temporary access to the 
products of the process of playing the sonata, and this is true 
even if the process is imagined.  So, the remainder of this article 
is based on the assumptions that a distinction can be made 
between explicit (declarative) knowledge and implicit (process) 
knowledge, even if both are instantiated in some way in the 
connectivity and activity in the brain, and that consciousness can 
sample explicit knowledge (only). 
Development of the Self 
Expressing cognitive innovation as a recursive, self-modifying 
function makes clear an essential drive at the heart of living 
acknowledgement of external representation also significantly 
modifies what would be, in effect (and possibly is in lower 
organisms), a closed system of stimulus and apparatus. In the 
context of creativity described here, representation is less 
concerned with its most familiar function - communication - 
and more to do with self-recognition and resistance to 
intellectual stasis. As a consequence the action that leads to 
representation externalizes the system’s proclivity for novelty, 
(in a social manifestation such as a painting) and the system is 
further stimulated by the recognition of an external novelty.  
Critical discourse and history as responses to a social 
manifestation, amplifies the power and visibility of novelty by 
transcending individual experience as the benchmark of the 
new. This social amplification comes at a price since it 
produces a stifling double bind in that although the artist (for 
example) must dig deep within themselves to seek what is 
important, the relevance of what they find must extend beyond 
the individual if it is to respond to the irresistible appetite for 
material novelty. In short it is the formula for art, (and 
possibly other modes of knowledge production), that in the 
case of a representation, the particular is only significant if and 
when it has general relevance, and only through the most 
intense and obsessive engagement with the particular can the 
generality be uncovered and meaningfully invoked.  
Creativity and Technology 
Plumbing the depths of human history for the origins of art, or 
other social manifestations of creativity, is possibly less 
important here than outlining its contemporary function; not 
least because the material evidence that informs the history of 
the origination of representation is simply too slight. Without 
the fullest contextualization of any representation, its function 
and purpose can only at best comprise informed speculation 
and this characterises much that it written about cave paintings 
for example. Thinking about the functions of art in a 
contemporary context is more sustainable in that there is a 
wealth of evidence to draw on in the exponential growth in the 
volume of social manifestations of human endeavour. In the 
critical engagement with these manifestations creativity is 
acknowledged as both a cognitive function (probably posited 
on a cognitively impenetrable impulse to recognise novelty) 
and a cultural predilection to valorise the new. In this scenario, 
creative novelties claim attention in as much as they offer a 
material representation of human cognition and ingenuity in 
action.  
The cultural privilege of creativity as a virtuous human quality 
filters the arts (in the present and the past) for evidence of a 
particular class of novelty that has, or has the potential for, a 
transformative effect. Tracing and narrating this 
transformative effect is the work of contextual memory, 
without which the novel becomes undifferentiated from the 
personally new.  Without a narrative each new day is an 
entirely new beginning. As a consequence the human 
apparatus is burdened with another task in addition to internal 
reflection and external representation set out at the start of this 
paper. Each observation/reflection and representation must be 
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systems5. At birth, the human infant has some rudimentary 
abilities or basic processes, F, which include instinctive drives 
such as feeding and sleeping, and the ability to sense and express 
(communicate) its internal emotional state. At this stage the set 
of explicit knowledge, x, is more or less empty. But there is 
something else at work, and that is an active, restless, not 
necessarily conscious process of extracting information from the 
world. This process can be demonstrated even in sleeping 
neonates. For example, differential brain activations in one day 
old babies are elicited depending on whether a sound can be 
anticipated or not (Stefanics et al., 2007). This differential 
activation also reflects contextual influences, so if rather than 
occurring randomly, a previously unexpected sound forms part of 
a repeating pattern, it no longer merits (or gets) special mention, 
even if the probability of its occurrence is the same in both cases. 
We cannot be sure what is going on but this makes sense from 
an information perspective, as when something unexpected 
occurs, it potentially contains new information, while if it forms 
part of a known pattern, it does not. From the start then, there is 
an ongoing (mostly non-conscious) process of detecting and 
representing regularities or patterns in the world, within which 
framework subsequent perceptions are processed. Pattern 
representation and novelty detection are equally important flip-
sides of the process of information gathering, which together 
provide the infant with the ability to acquire and internalise 
knowledge about the world6, its structures and its dynamics.  
This innate exploratory process is amplified exponentially 
through action which facilitates experimentation and critical 
exploration of the quality and reliability of the infant's 
knowledge. Agency blossoms; actions open up new modes of 
experience, new ways of knowing, new possibilities for 
interacting with others, and ultimately the construction of the 
(shareable concept of the) self. The paradox at the heart of this 
notion of the self being something that is iteratively constructed 
and continuously subject to modification, is that one generally 
has a subjective sense of a singular self despite the enormous 
changes the self clearly undergoes. It is only under extreme 
trauma that disconnects, such as phantom limbs or multiple 
personalities arise. In other words, F remains F even though Fti 
and Ftj may be totally different; as long as Ftj was reached from Fti 
as result of a recursive process it seems we are happy to consider 
them as being instances of the same self. 
Underpinning all of this is a set of intrinsic processes that 
constantly evaluate the state of the individual and the results of 
its actions (including internal 'actions' such as thinking) within 
the context of expected consequences. When something 
unexpected occurs (e.g. some new object appears on the scene, 
some behaviour produces unanticipated outcomes, some new 
idea emerges), differential (novelty) brain responses are 
integrated into a personal story of memory as a history of 
(among other things) novelty. History is a story of significant 
change told in a way that is consistent with the present. This 
means that the irresistible attraction of novelty at both 
cognitive and cultural levels drives perception simultaneously 
in two directions: the past and the present. What was new then 
and how does that relate to what is new now: Laius thought 
that he had killed his son at birth but a shepherd brought him 
up and years later when he met his father on a bridge Oedipus 
killed him and later, married Jocasta unaware that she was 
his mother. Here the function of the recollected past can be 
claimed to be a necessary condition for the perception of the 
present, and we find ourselves engaging in one of the 
philosophical debates of the late nineteenth century that 
shaped both the breach with the Renaissance and the birth of 
Modernism. The propositions about the nature of the present 
launched by Marey, Bergson and Curie,  (to name just three) 
over the place of time and memory in perception remained 
unresolved in their lifetimes as they do to the present day, but 
the uncertainties about consciousness that they insist upon had 
a transformative effect on material culture through the arts, 
sciences and humanities.  
Modern Technology 
In the wake of this uncertainty a new idea of what technology 
was for and could do replaced earlier concepts of it as a tactic 
to alleviate the hardships of nature through muscular 
amplification.  Based on a mechanical physics that was largely 
driven by the needs of the manufacturing, agricultural, 
extractive and transportation industries technology meant 
brute power. Intelligent machines were left to the realms of 
magic and spectacle. Where the technologies of the eighteenth 
and early nineteenth century responded to a pre-existing world 
of hardship and natural obstacles, the new understanding of 
technology, in contrast, was manifest in devices that 
originated in an understanding of the affordance of human 
perception as a defining quality of our species. A perception 
that was also, in many ways, an instrumental but deficient 
apparatus in the sense that imagination outstripped that which 
could be perceived. Built on a discontent with the limitations 
of sensory range, recall and reproduction, the emergent 
technological trajectory in the second half of the nineteenth 
century was concerned not just with the enhancement of 
perception but also with the development of devices that 
extended its range to superhuman levels.  
While in previous centuries technologists had developed 
ocular and specular devices through, and with which, to more 
clearly observe the material world, in the late nineteenth 
century the amalgamation of scientific instrumentation with a 
                                                     
5 As a baseline, there are random mutations, some of which are preserved through natural selection. As animals become more sophisticated, they 
develop more nuanced exploratory behaviour as they learn about their worlds. This behaviour is driven by intrinsic reward mechanisms, modulated 
by emotionally-valenced memories. The important point here is that the processes of cognitive innovation are fundamental to the adaptability and 
autonomy of all living creatures, including humans. 
6 By world here we mean anything external to the neonate, but it could equally well be argued that something similar must apply to the internal 
milieu. 
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triggered7. Novelty detection is a pervasive brain function. 
Unexpected events are given salience through enhanced neural 
responses in many brain areas8, and transient activation of the 
mesolimbic dopamine system (Schultz, 1998). Activating the 
dopamine system has two important consequences. Firstly, 
dopamine facilitates learning (Wise, 2004) and so information 
about the event's relationships with other events, actions, 
context and consequential value (Schultz, Carelli, & Wightman, 
2015) is internalised, and in this way the individual acquires and 
refines its knowledge (x) and processes (F). Secondly, transient 
activation of the dopamine system is also linked to feelings of 
pleasure. So in some way, dopamine also provides an incentive 
for exploratory behaviour, driving the quest for new experiences 
and ideas; the lure of the new. 
Creativity 
Mapping out cognitive innovation as an inseparable amalgam of 
knowledge and process helps to position creativity. Creativity is 
the term in common usage. It is a term that in our time seems to 
deliver an implicit value judgement (creative = good, non-
creative = mundane, bad), a term that has become muddied and 
ill-defined in trying to encompass everything from the profound 
act of creating a new scientific theory ('CREATIVITY') to the 
everyday resourcefulness displayed by people as they try to 
overcome daily challenges ('small creativity'). The definition most 
commonly used in psychological studies is that creativity is the 
production of 'something that is novel (original) and useful 
(valuable, appropriate)'; for a review of its provenance  see 
(Runco & Jaeger, 2012). This definition has spawned an array of 
tests, often focussed in practice on people's ability to think up 
multiple solutions to some problem, with creativity being 
equated to the number and novelty of the solutions they 
provide. In this scenario, novelty is judged by the experimenter 
(in relation to some norm) rather than the individual, and little 
emphasis is placed on measuring the 'value' or relevance of the 
solutions to the individual,  or their ability to synthesize 
knowledge gained through the creative process. In sum, these 
objective 'divergent thinking' measures of creativity take little 
account of the role of agency or the component processes 
involved in creativity, and, in attempting to create an ‘objective’ 
measure of creativity, end up by substituting the subjectivity of 
the creator with the subjectivity of the experimenter. 
Might considering creativity in terms of the cognitive innovation 
framework outlined above provide pointers to more meaningful 
measures of creativity? Let us take each of the component 
processes of cognitive innovation in turn; exploration, 
exploitation, synthesis. Exploration implies an active intentional 
process of probing current boundaries to go beyond the known, 
identifying gaps in knowledge, posing new questions. Of all the 
definitions of creativity, the concept of 'forming something from 
nothing'9 is arguably the most misleading. Exploration is only 
sophisticated enquiry into human perception that mapped the 
flaws and restrictions of the senses spawned devices that 
described an alternative (and parallel) world that was 
discontinuous with the human sensibility. Many of these 
devices were developed as autonomous sensors that extended 
human sensibility in much the same way as pumps, presses, 
drills, engines and cranes extended muscular potential, but 
others delivered credible data - confirmed theoretically - that 
was acquired from beyond the sensory spectrum available to 
humans. The most direct example of this trend that springs to 
mind is the nineteenth century approach to what was later 
called photography and particularly chronophotography. The 
photograph delivered images of events that humans could 
understand but were only accessible through the machines. 
Although there were many competing vectors driving the 
enterprise that was eventually stabilized into the photograph as 
the instrumental device that we might recognize today, a key 
determinant of the appeal was a dissatisfaction with existing 
systems of capturing visual data (and impressions). This was 
particularly the case in the context of an evidence based 
perception that used photography as an augmented ‘eye’ to 
underpin the very idea of fact that was detached from human 
perception. Etienne Jules Marey and his teams of researchers 
at the Physiological Station in Paris for example were driven 
by fundamentally pragmatic ‘real world’ questions about 
blood-stock, fatigue and movement while at the same time 
they struggled with the philosophical problem of exactly what 
version of reality their instruments revealed.  
Creating Reality 
Marey and his team’s technological approach to the 
conundrums of time and movement embraced the sensory 
apparatus of the human in the same way that Renaissance 
artists responded to the collapse of Byzantine conventions: 
they dug deep within the human apparatus to discover its 
functionality and replicated its sensory mechanism through an 
observable effect. In the case of chronophotography or high 
speed photography for example, this was achieved not simply 
by amplifying human perception as though it were a muscle, 
but in revealing things that only the camera could ‘see’. In this 
they exceeded the possibilities in ways that resituated the 
human as an alien form in a parallel instrumental reality. In 
much the same way as the microscope did when its powers of 
magnification exceeded any possibility of touch or any other 
human physical engagement. Put allegorically; the imaginary 
muscular giant of the steam hammer and locomotive was 
pitted against crafty gods who re-envisioned the world in ways 
that were beyond the giants reach - they may have been able to 
walk through the telescope to infinitely far but could never 
pass through the microscope to touch the infinitely small 
without changing their form. These gods saw things moving at 
speeds only accessible to the instruments they used to observe 
                                                     
7 From this list of possibilities it is clear that novelty can vary qualitatively from the rather passive or reactive (e.g. some new object appears on the 
scene unexpectedly) to the more intentional or active novelty that arises when a new idea is generated, for example. Whether the mechanisms for 
signalling novelty in these different cases are the same is not clear, but here I will assume some commonality. 
8 For example, as demonstrated in the mismatch negativity paradigm; for a review see (Naatanen, Paavilainen, Rinne, & Alho, 2007). 
9 Shorter Oxford Dictionary, 1986 
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meaningful within the context of the known. The truly creative 
individual is one who is able to draw on a comprehensive 
understanding of what is known, to ask the questions others 
have not thought to ask, to find the paths others have not 
investigated. These explorations are not randomly plucked from 
the ether; they are situated, and acquire meaning, within the 
context of current knowledge, practice and sanctioned 
methodologies, driven by an internal reward system that is 
triggered by personal (subjective) measures of novelty. It is 
important to note that although knowledge can be both 
individual and collective, the exploratory processes described 
here are essentially made in relation to personal knowledge. In 
other words the individual must have internalised the relevant 
collective knowledge in order to find those new pathways that 
are interestingly new to others too. Novelty detection in this 
context can be seen to provide a subjective contextual indicator 
of passing through some boundary of the known10. 
Creativity is generative, i.e. some new thing (artefact, idea, etc) is 
forged. In contrast to cognitive innovation, which is focussed on 
the development of the individual and does not necessarily 
require the generation of explicitly (consciously) accessible 
representations or products, creativity does11. This aspect of 
creativity is associated with exploitation and notions of selection, 
elaboration, and value. From all of the possible questions to 
think about or artefacts to create, some choice has to be made. It 
is here that intuition12 and value judgement play a crucial role. 
No-one knows what the future holds, but somehow judgements 
are made about the potential value of the options. In the first 
instance, this selective process is subjective, based on the 
intrinsic (not necessarily conscious) value-judgements of the 
creator. The initial 'externalisation' of the product is an internal 
one, which occurs as novel concepts, or even accidental 
discoveries, are consciously considered and evaluated within the 
subjective realm of the creator. Of course individuals are situated 
within communities so these internal processes may also be 
influenced by (actual or anticipated) external feedback from 
others. 
Finally, the knowledge and processing skills gained through these 
explorations are incorporated within existing (personal and 
collective) knowledge structures and processes, the implications 
and ramifications explored and consolidated. This account of 
creativity differs from other models in the stress it places on 
knowledge consolidation, and modifications to internal processes 
which are honed through practice. From this viewpoint we can 
see that creative novelty (valuable novelty) is not simply 
something new, it is something new in relationship to existing  
(internal and external) frameworks of knowledge. The most 
useful novelty, therefore, is one which is positioned not too far 
from (known) boundaries so that it can be incorporated within 
existing frameworks (reified in the academic practice of 
identifying and acknowledging antecedents to one’s current 
them and constructed a version of the world superior to 
humans dependent on the amplified perception afforded by a 
new idea of technology 
Cognisant Machines 
The very idea of technology as it developed in the closing 
decades of the nineteenth century precipitated a formalistic 
problem of understanding experience. Devices such as the 
phonograph or photographic camera represented real world 
perceptions mechanically or chemically with uncanny 
similarity to the dominant modes of simulating experience. 
These modalities were indebted to conventions that were 
primarily established in the arts through sound instruments, 
paintings and prints. However, as technologies diverged from 
earlier forms they revealed aspects of the world that were 
theoretically consistent with scientific laws but only evidenced 
through the device’s own descriptive apparatus. Through the 
apparently higher truth of objectivity they gained an authority 
that challenged and modified the representational aspects of 
the artist’s project of self-realization. The tensions that this 
created are expressed in the conflicting responses to 
chronophotographic images of movement that contradicted the 
established conventions of representation. Most famously this 
is found in the disputes that Marey and Muybridge became 
embroiled in over instrumental truths of the horse’s movement 
that were considered ‘ugly’ and therefore untrue. Nonetheless 
the apparent autonomy of the technologies yielded what was 
ultimately considered a higher truth that, in virtue of its special 
particularity, trumped any experiential or phenomenological 
evidence that was drawn from within the individual. In 
contrast human evidence was recognized as individually 
powerful but universally irrelevant except in special 
circumstances. In the Romantic and Expressive paradigm, the 
reservoir of the soul, (suitably detached from rationality), held 
such experience as an idiosyncratic feature of individual 
sensibility that was not reproducible as a relevant universal 
truth in any meaningful way. Art and the kind of creativity 
that was associated with it, was effectively detached from 
technology and science. 
Born of novelty detection, one of the key drivers of creativity 
in the form of the Renaissance, the technological imaginary of 
the late nineteenth century appropriated the primary 
imperative of self-reflection by offering a novel world that 
was defined as an instrumental reality. The technologies that 
had promised to serve so well to reveal the invisible 
manifestations of elemental truths passed over the individual 
in favour of their own autonomous universe. While steam 
engines, drills, presses, looms and pumps could be inventively 
combined to deliver new processes and products, by virtue of 
their apparent capacity to reflect upon their own capacities, 
late nineteenth century technologies existed in a relational grid 
                                                     
10 It should be noted that novelty detection is not necessarily always attractive. Under some circumstances, uncertainty can evoke feelings of 
discomfort (fear of the unknown), and so novelty in a way also signals moving outside the safe boundaries of the known.  
11 The generative nature of creativity is implicit within most definitions, and self-evident within the arts and humanities; how else can anyone know 
that something has been created? But it is an important point to articulate here in order to distinguish cognitive innovation from creativity. 
12 Intuition or gut-feelings may arise from emotional tagging as suggested by Damasio in his somatic marker hypothesis [Damasio, A.R. (1996). The 
somatic marker hypothesis and the possible functions of the prefrontal cortex. Philos Trans R Soc Lond B Biol Sci.;351(1346):1413-20].  
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thinking). In practice, it is probably misleading to think in terms 
of the continuously incremental cycle described here for reasons 
of simplicity. The process of creativity is undoubtedly a 
multiscale one; big new ideas require multiple iterations of 
smaller scale explorations and selections to fully work them out. 
At the macro scale this may give rise to step-like advances, as 
observed at personal as well as cultural scales.  
First and Second Order Effects 
From the account above, it becomes clear that the 
externalisation of the creative output has both first and second 
order effects. By first order I mean the subjective perspective of 
the creator. The creator is initially the only one with access to the 
newly generated thing (artefact, idea, and so on); it is their 
knowledge that sets the scene for questions and explorations 
and determines novelty, it their judgement of value that 
influences selection and decisions about what to exploit, and 
their knowledge base, thinking processes and skills that are first 
to be refined and influenced. Second order effects occur as 
others engage with the new thing, as it impinges on their own 
thought processes and behaviours. In reality, there are of course 
complex interactions between the two levels and they cannot be 
so neatly separated; external forces can strongly influence 
internal processing and explicit knowledge (though not implicit 
processes) can be fluidly transferred between individuals. 
It is not necessarily the case that individuals are driven by a 
conscious drive to produce novel outcomes; but an intrinsic 
reward system that activates in response to unexpected events 
creates a bias for generating outcomes that the individual 
perceives as novel. This is important. In life most creative 
practice requires sustained effort, so an intrinsic reward system 
that is able to generate what are essentially self-motivational 
signals provides the fuel needed to maintain the demanding 
multiscale processes of creativity without the need for 
(immediate) external reward that in any event must be delayed 
relative to the effort. The social context introduces an extra layer 
of reward and another potential source of motivation. In 
addition to intrinsic reward mechanisms, recognition by others 
can confer esteem, adulation, monetary incentive and power, 
which may (or may not) drive and influence the individual 
creative process. 
The Creativity Function 
The creativity function is a natural expansion of the cognitive 
innovation function, extended to include the social context 
within which individuals are situated. Externalisation of the 
outputs of the creative process makes them accessible to others. 
So it is not only the knowledge base and skill set of the individual 
that may be changed, the processes of exploration, selection and 
synthesis can now involve others. If, in addition, we allow G to 
represent cultural and societal processes, and y the set of 
communally known things, then we can approach a functional 
definition of creativity by generalising the cognitive innovation 
function to include the communal context: 
Ft+dt, xt+dt, Gt+dt, yt+dt, st+dt <=  Ft(Ft, xt, Gt, yt, st) 
This formulation expresses the potential for the creativity of the 
individual to affect the wider community in some measurable 
way; i.e. the individual creates something that makes a 
measurable difference in y (communal knowledge) or G (the way 
the community 'thinks' or acts). It also captures the notion of a 
of value that replicated the ambitions of those who earlier had 
sought to represent their own perceptual engagement with the 
world around them The human idea that the world was there to 
be experienced became the causa sui of the nineteenth century 
idea of technology whose truths were only fully accessible 
through the internal scrutiny of the device. In high speed 
photography, for example, what an image meant became 
conflated with how it was made. 
Having appropriated the artistic project of the Renaissance in 
the late nineteenth century as the technological imaginary, the 
question of how to make something that has meaning to 
humans (and only to humans) had to be reformulated in ways 
that privileged novelty detection over the ‘perceptual’ 
consistency of the device. It is not surprising then to find that 
the social manifestations of human creativity in this period 
became progressively detached from precedents that had 
served so well for four centuries. In western painting and 
sculpture, figuration and veridical representation gave way to 
a preoccupation with images of the perceptual apparatus in 
process - whether in Impressionism, Post Impressionism, 
Futurism, Rayonism, Vorticism or even Surrealism, the human 
apparatus in action became the topic of the image, displacing 
sacred and secular mythologies as the primary address of the 
art work. This vision of technology, arguably both the hand 
maiden and driver of modern science, has continued to shape 
the technological imaginary into a form that simulates the 
double action of the cognitive system and its realization in the 
external world. 
Cinema and the Mechanisation of Cognition 
This particular account of creativity as multidisciplinary, 
malleable and as historically contingent suggests a special 
place for the cinematographe and its passage to its institutional 
form as cinema. There are many full accounts of its 
provenance in arts as well as descriptions of the vectors of 
science, technology and entertainment that shaped it. What 
might be added to these accounts is a consideration of the 
coalition of chronophotography as a technological response to 
the Renaissance project - not as an extension of a realist 
imperative by the addition of movement, nor as a natural 
consequence of the industrialization of the image - but the 
product of a modern technological imaginary that privileged 
instrumental perception over muscular amplification. The 
cinema delivered its hermetic logic both technologically, and 
affectively through the incorporation of the cognitively 
impenetrable effect of projecting images interspersed with a 
blank screen at a rapid rate. The industrial form of this quickly 
founded its own institutions and architectural presence in 
cities and towns across the world based exclusively on an 
instrument of perceptual consistency that simultaneously 
satisfied the appetite for novelty. In this institutional guise the 
cinema as the spectacular gave way to a predominantly 
narrative entertainment form driven by internal forces such as 
character traits, psychological motivation, and sex drive that 
were partially revealed through allegories of human cognitive 
operation. 
In a rapid evolutionary process of variation, adaptation, 
mutation and survival; through ticket sales, fanzines, and sell-
through of associated products, ranging from clothing to 
make-up, the cultural form of cinema that survives and 
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recursive self-modifying process that is influenced by (and in turn 
has the potential to modify) communal processes and 
knowledge. However, it is important to note that G actually 
represents the set of F's that make up society and it is not 
homogeneous; each F is different, and there are complex 
(multiscale) linkages between the F's, from tightly coupled small 
social groups to communities, cultures and nations. G may thus 
respond very differently in different places across the network to 
a novel artefact or idea. Time too becomes a crucial factor, as 
neither knowledge (y) nor cultural or social processes (G) can 
change instantaneously. Propagation through the communal 
network takes time, and in this process, information relating to 
the new creation, and even the new creation itself, may be 
transformed as individuals engage with it. The creation can 
capture the creative processes of others and in some sense 
acquire a life of its own that reaches far beyond the lifespan and 
immediate community of the creator. 
This definition of creativity provides an elegant way of capturing 
notions of novelty and value that prevail more generally, 
including in the arts. For an individual to feel creative they must 
produce something that is perceived by themselves as novel and 
valuable. For an individual to be recognised as creative they must 
produce something that is perceived by others as novel and 
valuable; i.e. the new thing should make a measureable change 
to y or G. In other words, the creativity of an individual is a multi-
layered quality which has both subjective and objectively 
observable aspects, and in analogy with consciousness, offers 
both hard and easy problems.  
Novelty is not absolute; what is novel for one individual may not 
be so for another. The novelty of a particular thing (artefact or 
idea) may in practice not even register for a particular individual 
unless it engages some set of knowledge personal to that 
individual, which activates a relevant representation of the 
known; novelty too far beyond an individual’s 'known' 
boundaries may simply be incomprehensible. Value too is clearly 
relative, as it is determined by the processes of the F's in G that 
engage with the new thing and respond by ignoring, resisting, or 
changing; i.e. in the individual F's that comprise G there are 
processes of selection that determine whether the new thing 
gains traction. This means that the state of each F in G is a crucial 
factor in determining what influence any particular new idea or 
artefact has on their intrinsic processes. The real objective 
measure of creativity then is the extent to which the new thing 
engages (individuals or communities within) society and changes 
communal knowledge and behavioural and thought processes.  
Non-creativity 
What does it mean not to be creative? Non-creativity falls easily 
from this definition too as the production of novel ideas or 
products that do not change the thought processes or knowledge 
of the individual (first order effect). If there is no first order 
effect, there may or may not be a second order effect since this 
depends on the state of others; i.e. there is potential for some 
disconnect here. For example, simply painting something that 
has not been painted before is new by definition, but may 
nevertheless not be perceived by the painter as situated beyond 
any personal boundaries. Therefore, in the terms outlined here it 
may not engage the painter’s intrinsic reward system (even if it 
does engage the extrinsic one) and so will not feel like a creative 
process. This possibly also offers a reason why non-creativity 
(often called Mannerism in the arts) is less pleasurable than 
flourishes today (at least in Europe, and the USA) developed. 
Its success was founded on the parasitic incorporation of the 
perceptual apparatus of the audience to establish an apparently 
autonomous form of technological creativity that was 
independent of human agency. As the brief quotation from 
Metz that opens this essay suggests, the primary identification 
of the audience in the cinema is not with stars and action but 
with the apparatus as a surrogate of the self. In this way how 
something was done, and what something meant, were 
satisfactorily conflated. It was a truly modern technology that 
replicated cognition in action. 
The cinema was not of course the only technology to satisfy 
these criteria, but it does epitomize them in a way that 
prepares the user for a further iteration of the technological 
imaginary in devices that are also exploit perceptual 
aberrations in the human ‘apparatus’. These technologies 
effectively fully replicate an illusion of creativity by reducing 
(or disavowing) the contributory function of the user and, 
more convincingly, simulating autonomous agency and 
novelty recognition as a property of the machine. The most 
obvious contemporary example is the text messaging system 
and its alerts that are the economic core of mobile telephony. 
This further extension of creativity - at least in the context 
above - as an historically contingent illusion of the machine, 
poses questions beyond the bounds of technology studies, 
media studies and cultural history and leads to the core of the 
current understanding of human creativity. Creativity is no 
longer, as it once was, a signifier of personal gift or talent (or 
indeed direct connection with God) but another contender for 
attention in the slack water of an economic logic, which at its 
best, describes a hierarchy of usefulness; a perfect market that 
in its daily form maximises value for its own sake. In one 
sense the demise of the earlier concept of creativity, whose 
meaning we partially inherit from a previous age, is little more 
than the familiar transmutations attributed to the dynamics of 
language. However, creativity and novelty recognition are not 
simply cultural or economic properties of a society but are 
seen here as crucial structural and micro structural elements in 
the human cognitive system. For this reason it may be useful 
to ground our understanding of the socially recognisable 
manifestations of creativity in the neural processes of 
cognitive innovation.  
The Creative Artwork 
Similar accounts to the one above can be woven to give an 
account of creativity in relation to music, literature, the 
performing arts and more. They will inevitably be partial, 
provisional and told from the present as will any account of 
the past. But it is important to acknowledge, as we address 
creativity in the present use of the term, that any ahistorical 
and universalist claims for it in the contexts of high art will 
also be partial provisional and teleological. Moreover the work 
of distinguishing the artist’s drive from the conditions of 
production has been a preoccupation of critics and scholars 
since the early moderns. But distinguishing these elements in 
an artwork should not be confused with explaining them. 
Although not formally introduced in to the academy until the 
nineteenth century, critics have acknowledged a self-conscious 
awareness of the interpretative responsibility of the external 
witness to creativity in action in visual, theatrical and musical 
forms. In literature, for example the endurance of Chaucer, 
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creativity, even if society continues to confer the desired 
extrinsic rewards.  
Differentiating between first and second order effects has 
another benefit; the first order effects are generic, and so come 
into play across all forms and levels of creativity. We do not need 
to distinguish here between small and big creativity - the 
subjective sense of novelty, excitement and satisfaction apply to 
all. This leaves the extent of the second order effects (in time and 
space) to provide the measure which clearly distinguishes smaller 
from larger creative acts. 
This view of creativity has implications for the measurement of 
individual creative potential. Simply being able to generate lots 
of solutions to some specified problem has only a tangential 
relationship with creativity in practice. In addition to generating 
novel solutions to some problem, the creative individual needs to 
be able to find the interesting questions, correctly select 
promising paths to pursue, modify their internal representations 
to synthesize their expanding knowledge base and hone their 
creative skills.  Furthermore, their judgements should resonate 
with those of others if their creations are to have any impact 
beyond the personal.  In essence, the creative individual needs a 
keen sense of self and an even keener sense of others. Current 
methods for measuring creativity, even those apparently based 
on real-life achievements, generally focus on the individual and 
their products without considering the contributory function of 
others; something that lies at the core of creativity as an arts 
practice and is clearly evidenced by publishing practices in the 
sciences and humanities. The ability to communicate ideas 
through artworks or other outputs, to engage the imagination 
and ultimately to leverage the creativity of others of others, is 
what marks out the exceptionally creative individual. 
Further Thoughts 
Cultures just like people may be more or less creative, more or 
less resistant to new ideas. Just as the detection and 
representation of patterns sets the scene for novelty detection in 
perception, so too the synthesis of deep knowledge which resists 
change provides the bedrock for unexpected connections, 
creative transformations and new breakthroughs. Constant 
creativity, just like constant novelty, is not only meaningless, it is 
practically impossible. Cultures can only tolerate (accommodate 
and make cognitive use of) so much creativity; the consolidation 
of newly discovered processes and knowledge is equally (possibly 
more) important and also takes time and practice. There is a 
balance to be struckthen, both at the personal and the cultural 
level, between novelty and familiarity, innovation and repetition, 
exploration and exploitation. It is also clear, though not explored 
here, that familiarity and repetition are equally (perhaps more) 
compulsive and bring their own pleasures and rewards.  
The ideas expressed in this paper suggest a new definition of 
creativity: the generation of something that (measurably) 
changes the knowledge, behaviour and/or thought processes of 
the creator and (some group of) others. The hope is that this 
definition, applicable across many disciplines, may give rise to 
new more holistic measurements of individual and group 
creativity that are both personally and culturally meaningful. 
There is one final point to note, the component processes of 
creativity are both conscious and non-conscious, with the latter 
arguably dominating. This resonates with the earlier distinction 
between explicit and implicit memory and has similar 
Shakespeare, Sterne and Defoe is posited on the explicit 
invitation to enjoin with the author’s creativity on condition 
that the reader’s understanding of it will always be incomplete 
and in that incompleteness lies its fascination. Literary 
criticism, art criticism and music criticism along with their 
handmaiden histories now form established academic 
pathways based emphatically on the assumption that (i) the 
fullest account of an externalisation of creative thought (a 
social manifestation) will never be fully accounted for and will 
always be open for interpretation, and (ii) that the beholder’s 
share in constructing an account of the cognitive processes of 
the artist will always tend to envision the springs of creativity 
in the reader’s own image (and time). To this we might add 
the lessons of reader response criticism; that it does not always 
follow that the impressions and speculations of the reader are 
reliable indications of the processes of writing. Indeed there is 
certainly a case to be made that the virtues and pleasures of 
the work of art are precisely derived from the threshold and 
quality of inscrutability that the connoisseur and informed 
reader encounter.  
Further Thoughts  
It cannot be said too often that this account of how creativity 
and the arts have intertwined in a particular context and period 
is partial, provisional and told from the author’s present. There 
are many more convincing stories to be told by many other 
kinds of scholars. But what they will all share is some of the 
thickness and density of this account. These kinds of 
discussions about what appears to be a basic and enduring 
human driver stand in contrast to populist discussions in 
contemporary journalism and also many of the assumed 
scenarios that appear in the scientific literature. Given the 
qualifiers of readership and purpose this too does not present a 
significant discussion point: departments of journalism and 
creative writing do sit alongside departments of literature in 
many universities to great mutual benefit. In the same way 
many of those trained in the sciences actively engage in the 
arts as connoisseurs, patrons and practitioners. In the 
neurosciences, however, there are distinct problems for the 
study of cognition in as much as its object of study is deeply 
embedded in the human ‘operating system’ that controls, 
recognises, selects and interprets the actions of the human. In 
parallel this operating system precipitates what we are 
increasingly calling ‘social manifestations’ of that system in 
action that are both individual expressions of creativity and 
interactive responses to the generality of social manifestations 
(e.g. the arts) that we might for convenience call cultural glue. 
In short any observation or engagement with creativity (as a 
social manifestation or through self-reflection) immediately 
changes the observed and observer in structural ways. What 
may be considered unique about neuroscience is that humans 
studying human cognition never remain the same humans 
even in the most basic way as for example reading about the 
brain changes the reader’s brain. As a consequence, in the 
flows of cognition we are simultaneously dealing with an 
epistemological and an ontological problem. For teachers, 
practitioners and researchers who share a concern with the 
cognitive processes of creativity, this presents a conundrum, 
since approaches that are either solely epistemologically or 
solely ontologically driven will necessarily always be 
incomplete. To understand the cognitive aspects of creativity it 
seems that we need nothing less than a new kind of science. A 
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consequences; i.e. one does not, and cannot, have conscious 
access to the entire creative process13. Consequently, one lacks 
(complete) intentional control over it. The best one can do is to 
lay a groundwork that facilitates the creative processes and then 
wait patiently for conscious access to the emergence of new 
ideas and insights that can be further worked out14.  
new science as radical and challenging in its intentions and 
methodology as that that provoked by Bacon, Galileo, 
Newton, Boyle, Hooke, Davy, Freud and Bohr all of whom, in 
their various ways, were intent on recovering the fullest 
account of the subjectivity of the experience of the world and 
expressing it in new laws. It is worth recalling that the very 
foundations of experimental science, analysis and reductive 
method in the 15th century were developed to recover an 
Edenic completeness in our understanding of ourselves in the 
world. This is some way from the current situation in which 
creativity is frequently defined in reduced behavioural terms 
that many find difficult to reconcile with the view in the arts 
and letters that creativity is contingent, and a co-production 
between social, individual and shared forces in a present that 
is a product of perception and memory. We hope that the 
concept of cognitive innovation will help in this debate. 
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